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Abstract
We analyze short-term effects of free hospitalization insurance for the poorest quin-
tile of the population in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan. First, we 
exploit that eligibility is based on an exogenous poverty score threshold and apply a 
regression discontinuity design. Second, we exploit imperfect rollout and compare 
insured and uninsured households using propensity score matching. With both meth-
ods we fail to detect significant effects on the incidence of hospitalization. Whereas 
the program did not meaningfully increase the quantity of health care consumed, 
insured households more often choose private hospitals, indicating a shift towards 
higher perceived quality of care.
Keywords Health insurance · Universal health care · Program evaluation · Health 
care consumption · Pakistan
JEL classification O12 · I13 · I15 · O22
1 Introduction
In lower- and middle-income countries, economic inequity is linked to inequity in 
health. One of the chains by which these are bound together is through high out-of-
pocket (OOP) expenditures for health. These affect poor households in two ways: 
First, they create financial distress, in particular in the case of expensive events, 
such as hospitalizations. Second, they create barriers to health care, contributing to 
 * Simona Helmsmüller 
 simonahel@gmail.com
 Andreas Landmann 
 andreas.landmann@fau.de
1 Bonn-Rhein-Sieg University of Applied Sciences, Sankt Augustin, Germany
2 Present Address: Friedrich-Alexander University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen, Germany
 The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review
a low health status and therefore potentially also lower ability to generate income. 
A straightforward approach to breaking this vicious cycle is to provide health insur-
ance to the poor. Many recent reforms in lower- and middle-income countries 
around the world are thus establishing inclusive health insurance schemes, with the 
aim of not only reducing financial distress, but also to change health seeking behav-
ior by reducing financial barriers.
In this paper, we explore whether fully subsidized insurance for hospitalization 
changes health service utilization of low-income households in Pakistan. In particu-
lar, we evaluate the Social Health Protection Initiative (SHPI) in the province of 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), which grants fully subsidized health insurance to the 
poorest quintile of the population. By studying the patterns of inpatient care con-
sumption, we not only investigate changes in the quantity of care consumed, but also 
study whether the composition of care changes. An especially relevant dimension 
here is the probability to seek care from private providers, which patients associ-
ate with higher quality in our study. To evaluate the effect of insurance coverage, 
we use two features of the program. First, we implement a regression discontinuity 
design, using the fact that eligibility for the program is based on a pre-defined, exog-
enous poverty score. Whereas this approach has a high internal validity, inference 
is valid only for households around the poverty cut-off score. Therefore, as comple-
mentary second approach, we exploit incomplete rollout and match insured to com-
parable, eligible but uninsured households using propensity score matching. These 
approaches allow us to calculate two separate effects: the intention-to-treat effect for 
households close to the cut-off and the average treatment effect on the treated for 
eligible households.
The results of both econometric approaches suggest that the SHPI did not have 
significant effects on the quantity of health care consumption, despite high levels of 
neglected health care. We find no increase in the propensity of using inpatient health 
care services, no increase in the share of individuals who visited a hospital more 
than once in the past year, and no decrease of neglected health care. However, we 
find evidence suggesting a change of provider choice from public to private facili-
ties. This is consistent with a larger reduction of relative costs of private care vs pub-
lic care in our data as well as with a small number of claims from public hospitals in 
administrative data, suggesting that public hospitals implemented the program less 
efficiently. Given the better resources and higher client satisfaction associated with 
private hospitals, we nevertheless interpret this as an important positive impact of 
the program. Should the demand shift from public to private providers not be in the 
interest of the government, however, additional programs to strengthen the capacity 
of public hospitals might be necessary.
Several studies have analyzed the effect of protecting low-income households 
through health insurance. Randomized control trials (RCT) on micro health insur-
ance programs have shown some promising impacts in terms of financial protection 
(see Habib et al. 2016 for a recent review), access to medical services (e.g. Levine 
et al. 2016; Thornton et al. 2010), and social outcomes (e.g. Landmann and Froe-
lich 2015; Froelich and Landmann 2018). In line with this, there is a move towards 
universal health coverage via a rapid expansion of state-funded health insurance 
arrangements across lower- and middle-income countries (Lagomarsino et al. 2012; 
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Reich et  al. 2016). However, results from RCTs do not necessarily carry over to 
larger programs where limited absorptive capacity might hamper the effect (Man-
gham and Hanson 2010), and not every program design allows for plausible identi-
fication strategies. Whereas some quasi-experimental studies exist on health insur-
ance reforms in countries such as India, China, and Indonesia (Wagstaff et al. 2009; 
Prinja et  al. 2017; Vidyattama et  al. 2014), evidence on the Pakistani program is 
scarce, even though it is a very relevant case for several reasons.
Pakistan is a lower middle income country with the sixth largest population in 
the world, where poverty and the risk of falling into poverty are still widespread. 
According to World Bank Indicators (2016), Government spending on health has 
been 0.82% of GDP until the SHPI became operational in 2016 and around 63% 
of health expenditure had to be paid out-of-pocket. Government spending is higher 
(1.36% of GDP) and out-of-pocket expenditure is slightly lower (56%) in the group 
of lower middle income countries on average, but India, which shares many chal-
lenges in the health sector, has similar numbers (0.94% and 63%).1 This situation 
increases the need for inclusive insurance solutions, which many other lower and 
middle income countries have recently addressed through publicly funded health 
insurance schemes as well (Cotlear et al. 2015). While the fragmented nature of the 
health system with provincial responsibility for the health policies renders reforms 
more difficult, these might have particularly high effects. In addition, through the 
fully subsidized scheme with household enrollment based on a pre-existing poverty 
census, the program achieved remarkably high enrollment rates and mitigated the 
problem of adverse selection which challenges similar interventions in other coun-
tries (Banerjee et al. 2019; Asuming 2013).
At the same time, Pakistan features a dual health sector with both private and 
public providers operating in the same market. A similar situation exists in India, 
which has undergone large-scale reforms with far-reaching transformations in the 
health care market a few years earlier. In this context, large health financing reforms 
might shape the long-term character of the market and it is therefore worth studying 
how demand in each sector is affected by insurance. For Cambodia, Levine et  al. 
(2016) find that insured households shift towards public hospitals, but in their case 
private hospitals were not empaneled by the program, which means that patients 
simply shift towards participating hospitals. This is also what Thornton et al. (2010) 
find in Nicaragua, where insured households were more likely to visit health care 
providers covered under the insurance. We contribute to this literature by studying a 
setting under which insurance coverage was in principle available at both public and 
private providers. Note that effective coverage might still have differed between the 
two sectors, as these face different incentives and dispose of different resources and 
governance structures for implementation. In fact, our finding of an increased usage 
of private care is consistent with a more efficient program implementation in pri-
vate hospitals, suggesting the importance of including the private sector to increase 
absorptive capacity. Despite the relevance of the research question for public policy, 
there is virtually no evidence on the impact of large state-funded insurance schemes 
1 World Bank Indicators for 2016 are available at http:// data. world bank. org.
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on public vs private health systems if insurance coverage is offered at both. By look-
ing at demand-side effects, we thus contribute to closing this evidence gap in the 
context of a nascent health insurance system in Pakistan.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we provide the country 
context and program details. In Sect. 3 we present details of our dataset and sum-
marize descriptive statistics. In Sect. 4 we explain our two main identification strate-
gies and assess the plausibility of the underlying assumptions. Section 5 contains 
our main results on the usage of inpatient care and a brief analysis of heterogeneous 
effects. In Sect. 6 we discuss effect channels and challenges in implementation. The 
last section concludes.
2  Rationale of the intervention
2.1  Challenges in health care in Pakistan
Poor health is widespread in Pakistan. In its report from 2017, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) attests Pakistan to have the fifth highest burden of tuberculosis 
world-wide and the highest rate of malaria in the region, while being one of only 
three countries in the world where residual poliomyelitis (infantile paralysis) has not 
been eradicated. Hepatitis B and C, dengue and chikungunya show high prevalence, 
and leprosy and trachoma are still reported. Regarding non-communicable diseases, 
cancer, diabetes, respiratory and cardiovascular diseases are among the main causes 
of death. Maternal and child mortality are among the highest globally (WHO 2017).
With the abolition of the Federal Ministry of Health in 2011, health care manage-
ment and regulation became the responsibility of the Provincial Governments. These 
maintain networks of multi-tiered health care providers, yet overall public spending 
on health care is very low. In consequence, the quality, in particular of the primary 
health care infrastructure, is limited, suffering from political interference and cor-
ruption, shortage of trained personnel, staff absenteeism, non-functioning facilities, 
and lack of medicines (ADB 2019; WHO 2013). Notably, the non-existence of pub-
lic family physicians means that hospitals are often the first point of contact with the 
formal health care infrastructure. But even major district hospitals often lack spe-
cialized staff such as gynecologists, anesthetists or pediatricians (TRC 2012). There-
fore, households often use private service providers (Government of Pakistan 2016), 
implying that most of the health expenditures must be borne by the patient (Nishtar 
et al. 2013; WHO 2017). Also in public hospitals, expenditures, such as for medica-
tions, are usually paid out-of-pocket.
Social security systems are not broadly spread and leave the large majority of the 
population uncovered (Nishtar et al. 2013).2 Private health insurers, though existing, 
2 According to Nishtar et al. (2013), there are three vertical systems servicing 14.12% of the population: 
By the Armed Forces, by the Fauji Foundation for retired military servicemen, and by the Employees 
Social Security Institution for public servants. These are vertical, i.e., they have mutually exclusive ser-
vice delivery infrastructures.
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lack the depth of penetration, in particular into rural and poorer population groups, 
covering less than 3% of the population (Nishtar et  al. 2013). While there are a 
number of micro health insurance schemes run by non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), they have not achieved broad outreach. With one third of the population 
living on less than 1.5 USD per day and in the absence of affordable insurance, it is 
reasonable to assume that financial constraints lead to less than optimal health care 
among the poor population of Pakistan.
2.2  The Social Health Protection Initiative (SHPI)
Against this background, the Government of the Province of KP launched a large-
scale program to improve access to health care, called the SHPI. With financial and 
technical assistance of the German KfW Development Bank, the program intends 
to reduce financial barriers to health care through the introduction of a subsidized 
health insurance. The program uses a pre-existing national poverty score, which 
had been assigned to all households in Pakistan based on a proxy means test (PMT) 
in 2010.3 All households below a pre-defined cut-off poverty score were selected 
to receive the insurance card at fully subsidized rates. The first phase of the pro-
gram was officially launched in December 2015 in the four pilot districts Chitral, 
Kohat, Malakand, and Mardan. It covered households with poverty scores below 
16.17, corresponding to the poorest 21% of households in this area (approx. 0.7 mil-
lion people targeted). The program delivered the cards to beneficiaries via selected 
regional NGOs, who were in charge of forward campaigning (including but not 
limited to banners and call centers providing general information, radio announce-
ments and posters to inform about dates of enrollment at village level) as well as the 
physical distribution of insurance cards at special card distribution centers (includ-
ing permanent offices at district level and temporary offices at village level). Follow-
ing the official enrollment dates, unenrolled eligible households should be contacted 
directly by the insurer via phone or in person (Oxford Policy Management 2016). 
In addition, the consulting company advising the program on behalf of the KfW 
Development Bank verified the distribution of cards via a limited number of spot 
checks. Six months after the official launch, the insurer reported an enrollment rate 
of 87.3% among the target population in the two pilot districts considered in our 
study (Oxford Policy Management 2017).4
During our study period, one insurance policy covered a household of seven 
members (assumed typical case: household head, spouse, four children and one 
elderly dependent). The benefit package addressed maternity-related care as well as 
non-maternity hospitalization, up to an annual limit of PKR 25,000 (238.25 USD)5 
3 The Government revised the poverty score again only after our endline survey, so that during our study 
period and the five years prior to that the score remained unchanged for all households.
4 Whereas the program also foresaw voluntary, non-subsidized health insurance to the non-eligible pop-
ulation, no such product was on offer at the time of our study.
5 Exchange rate on December 31, 2015.
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per person.6 This covered treatment for normal delivery and C-sections, as well as 
a pre-defined list of 497 medical procedures requiring hospitalization. Notably, the 
program did not cover outpatient care.7
The insured households could obtain these services at one of the empanelled hos-
pitals, which include public and private health care providers.8 Prior to the distribu-
tion of insurance cards, the program identified and contacted potential hospitals for 
empanelment in the program, but was met with skepticism. Private providers were 
hesitant to join the network due to concerns regarding the reimbursement of costs, 
religious beliefs, or fear of stricter tax controls (Oxford Policy Management 2016, 
2017). Public hospitals also showed little interest in the program until Government 
influence was used to encourage joining the program. Nevertheless, the program was 
able to empanel around one third of the candidate private hospitals, as well as the 
two main public hospitals in each district. During our survey period, however, some 
hospitals were de-paneled due to the use of unnecessary procedures or, in one case, 
a conflict of interest. Overall, during our study period, there were at least four public 
and seven private hospitals available for service provision at all times.9 Before the 
official launch, the program trained hospital staff and established service desks in 
each empaneled hospital for identification of beneficiaries, verification of eligible 
treatment and available balance, and claim management for cashless service provi-
sion. For further gatekeeping, a District Medical Officer employed by the insurer 
visited clients within 24 h after admission.
Fully subsidized premiums naturally lead to an adverse incentive structure for 
the insurance company: The Government transfers the insurance premiums for each 
enrolled household, hence creating a steady flow of income from the Government 
to the insurer. At the same time, the cost structure of the insurance company, which 
was also responsible for the distribution of insurance cards, is determined by actual 
usage. The insurance company would hence benefit from not informing insured 
individuals of the full benefit package. Therefore, a mandated awareness campaign 
accompanied each phase of card distribution, carried out by the implementing 
9 Specifically, in Malakand the program started with three public hospitals, and three out of nine identi-
fied private hospitals. Later, one public and one private hospital were de-paneled, while one new private 
hospital joined. In Mardan, the program started with three public and five out of 14 identified private 
hospitals. Later, one public and two private hospitals were de-paneled, while one new private hospital 
joined (Oxford Policy Management 2016, Oxford Policy Management 2017).
6 We have administrative cost data only for a short period of time overlapping our study. Between Janu-
ary and July 2017, the median cost of treatment was 15,000 PKR in the two pilot districts considered 
here.
7 A second phase of the program, starting in January 2017, saw the gradual roll-out to the remaining 
districts and raised the poverty cut-off score to 26.75, thus covering approximately 51% of households in 
the district (approx. 14.4 million people targeted). The program also altered the benefits slightly, cover-
ing eight household members, raising the annual coverage limit and including tertiary care providers, but 
notably still restricting coverage to cases of inpatient care. Table A.1 in Online Appendix 1 provides an 
overview of the program features in both phases. Following the completion of our study, the Government 
initiated Phase 3, which extended the program to cover up to 69% of the population in the entire province 
of KP. Further extensions are planned with the aim of achieving universal health coverage.
8 Despite there being a number of NGOs active in the health sector in Pakistan, such as the Aga Khan 
Foundation, there are no NGO-run hospitals in our survey region.
The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review 
insurance company as well as the NGOs. A further challenge was the identification 
of beneficiary households, which were selected based on the poverty census from 
2010. This implies not only that the program does not necessarily target the cur-
rently poor, but also challenged the localization of households for enrollment given 
that addresses were partially outdated.10
The Government of the Province of KP is spearheading the program, supported 
by the KfW Development Bank with financial and technical cooperation. Consid-
ering the difficult political landscape of Pakistan, the Provincial Government had 
its own vested interest in the program which likely went beyond the distributional 
goals: At the time of our study, the Province of KP was governed by a different 
party than held power of the Federal Government. The Federal Government of Paki-
stan planned and slowly started rolling out a similar national social health insur-
ance. While the Federal Government had not implemented the national scheme in 
the Province of KP at the time of our study and hence did not create competition 
in economic terms, it most certainly imposed political competition. The Provincial 
Government was hence politically motivated to make the SHPI widely known and 
clearly associated with their party. Nevertheless, limited awareness remained a con-
cern, which we further address in Sect. 6.
2.3  Intended effects
The rationale behind the SHPI is that the insurance would lower the cost of hos-
pitalization and that this would affect households along two dimensions. On the 
one hand, lower OOP expenditures should encourage an increased usage of health 
services and hence the quantity of health care consumed. Thus, the program would 
contribute to health improvement. On the other hand, lower OOP expenditures 
directly decrease the households’ financial burden and reliance on more stressful 
coping strategies. Thus, the program would contribute to financial protection against 
health risks.11 Whereas we acknowledge the importance of financial protection for 
the poor in its own right, we concentrate on the first aim in this study, i.e., improving 
health by increasing health care consumption.
3  Data and descriptive statistics
3.1  Survey data
We make use of household survey data collected specifically for the program evalu-
ation. Four months prior to the start of the first program phase, we collected baseline 
10 After our study, the Government initiated a new survey to update the poverty score, which might 
improve targeting in later phases.
11 Additionally, the Government aimed at increasing quality and accountability of public hospitals by 
ensuring a client-based flow of funds through the program. We do not consider supply side effects in this 
study.
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data (autumn 2015). We carried out the endline survey 12 to 15 months after the 
first program rollout (spring 2017). Prior to the design of this evaluation, the Provin-
cial Government had selected four pilot districts for the first phase of the program, 
where the insurance was to be offered exclusively. We therefore collected data in 
these four districts as well as in four additional districts, initially intended as control 
districts. Political dynamics, however, led to an early extension of the program into 
control districts as well as differences in rollout across the four pilot districts. The 
data we use in this study therefore is from only two of the four pilot districts, where 
the initial rollout plan was largely followed and where our identification strategies 
are still valid (Malakand and Mardan).12 We also use data of the control districts for 
some robustness checks.13 Online Appendix 2 summarizes the timeline of the SHPI 
roll-out and our surveys in the relevant districts.
Our sampling strategy is a multi-staged clustered approach. We randomly selected 
24 union councils as survey clusters in the two pilot districts considered here. The 
poverty census of 2010 served as a sampling frame for the third and fourth stage: 
Stratified random sampling of 70 villages and then 1200 households in the two pilot 
districts. To increase power for our identification strategies, we additionally sampled 
240 households below and 480 closely around the cut-off poverty score in the pilot 
districts (i.e., an additional 20% and 40% respectively in each survey cluster). There-
fore, our baseline sample in the pilot districts consists of 1920 households of which 
828 were eligible for the insurance. Figure 1 depicts the distribution of the poverty 
score (a) in the sampling frame, (b) in our random sample and (c) in our total sam-
ple, respectively, illustrating the degree of the two types of oversampling, i.e., below 
and around the cut-off score of 16.17.
Interviewing the same households in the baseline and endline study, we con-
structed a household panel dataset. We used computer-assisted personal interviews 
in both survey waves, allowing the collection of GPS coordinates, an efficient survey 
administration and, thus, a minimal level of attrition of under 2.5%. An additional 
1.2% of the sample were dropped in the data cleaning process, leading to a panel 
dataset of 1842 households in the two pilot districts, of which 795 eligible house-
holds. We collected information on economic conditions, subjective well-being, 
the use of health care during childbirth, outpatient care, and neglected health care 
12 We also collected data in the two other pilot districts, namely Chitral and Kohat. In Kohat, however, 
our monitoring during the endline survey revealed several problems. Specifically, we find particularly 
high differences between official and self-reported enrollment in the urban areas. We also faced the high-
est attrition rate (7%) in this area. In addition, there were problems in the project implementation in this 
district with one hospital being suspected of fraud. We thus exclude the data from the whole district out 
of prudence. The district of Chitral, on the other hand, was hit by a severe flood just prior to the baseline. 
This negatively affected our data collection in terms of access to some areas. Also the empanellment of 
hospitals was much delayed, and the program became fully operational only after our endline survey, 
which led us to exclude this district as well. In Mardan, the second program phase started three months 
prior to the endline, which might create some first additional effects, but does not invalidate our empiri-
cal approach. We discuss implications for the regression discontinuity design in Sect. 4.1.
13 We selected the four control districts using an algorithm matching on publicly available socio-demo-
graphic indicators and health infrastructure. The second phase rolled out prematurely in two of these, but 
using a different cut-off score.
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on household level. In light of the focus of the program on inpatient treatment, we 
recorded the history of inpatient care, including associated costs, and the subjec-
tive health status of each household member individually. This leads to a final panel 
sample size of 12,862 individuals, thereof 6007 eligible for insurance, when consid-
ering inpatient care. In the endline survey, we administered the same questionnaire, 
but added questions on the enrollment status and familiarity with the program.
3.2  Data quality and processing
Our local research partner pre-tested, translated, and implemented the questionnaires 
on tablet computers. To a large extent, items are based on a questionnaire which had 
been tested repeatedly and demonstrated high validity in previous projects. At the 
end of each survey day, supervisors uploaded the data from the tablets onto a server 
and we downloaded data in Germany for monitoring of interviewer performance 
and data quality. Daily quality control included automated consistency checks, spot 
checks, and follow-up phone calls. Comparing GPS coordinates of a household at 
baseline and endline guaranteed that indeed the same household was interviewed.
We winsorized quantitative variables which showed a large variation. The level 
of winsorizing depends on the initial variation of the specific variable and ranges 
from the 90th to the 99th percentile. We performed a principal component analysis 
of asset ownership to derive a variable for socio-economic standing (in the follow-
ing denoted wealth index) and a principal component analysis of access to amenities 
such as toilets and drinking water to derive a variable for hygienic condition (in the 
following denoted hygiene index). For per capita household income, we account for 
economies of scale within the household and use the square root equivalent scale, 
i.e., we divide household income by the square root of household size. (An implica-
tion is that, e.g., a four-person-household has twice the monetary needs of a single 
person.)
We note that our survey might suffer from coverage error. This stems from the 
fact that the best available sampling frame, the poverty census, was collected in 
2010 and is hence partly outdated. Moreover, in the absence of official addresses 
of most households, the identification of sampled households was a challenge and 
might have led to population subgroups being missing not-at-random. However, one 
should note that the SHPI used the same frame to determine program eligibility. 
While our results might not be fully representative, e.g., for young and newly formed 
or migrated households, they are internally consistent under the plausible assump-
tion that all groups used for comparison in our identification strategies are likely to 
be similarly affected.
3.3  Baseline characteristics
Table 1 contains selected baseline characteristics of households and individuals in 
our panel samples, i.e., sampled households and their members in the two districts 
Malakand and Mardan with baseline as well as endline information. We separately 
present statistics on the full sample as well as on households eligible for insurance 
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coverage, i.e., with a poverty score below 16.17. Note that the goal here is not to 
give a representative picture of the population but to describe the samples we are 
using for our analysis. These samples include oversampling below and around the 
cutoff, and therefore do not reflect average differences between eligible and non-
eligible households in the population. We present statistics for the subsample of ran-
domly selected households in Table A.2 in Online Appendix (differences to table 
below are marginal).
The average household in our full sample consists of 7.43 members and of 8.09 
members in the subsample of eligible households. The members of eligible house-
holds are slightly younger (22 vs 23 years), more likely to be of school-aged (38% 
vs 33%), and a larger share has not completed primary school (63% vs 59%). Con-
versely, a smaller share of members has completed secondary school or higher (8% 
vs 12%). Consistently, the per capita household income among eligible households 
is around two thirds that of the full sample. There is a high gender disparity in edu-
cation and work (not shown in table): Among male adults, 47.0% in our full sample 
have no formal education, and this percentage rises to 82.1% among female adults. 
Similarly, 67.2% of male adults have worked for pay in the year prior to the baseline 
survey, compared to only 3.3% of female adults. Overall, hygienic conditions are 
sub-optimal: Whereas 96% of households have electricity in their home, only 36% 
have a private flush toilet and only 12% have tap water supply in their residence. 
Travel time to the next hospital averages 44 minutes.14 Notably, awareness about 
insurance is virtually non-existing at baseline.
Regarding the use of health care services, 5% of individuals in the full sample 
reported an overnight stay in a hospital within the 12 months prior to baseline. To 
understand the socio-economic drivers of using inpatient services, we run three 
logit regressions including individual and household covariates with different 
proxies for poverty, namely the poverty score, the per capita household income, 
and the wealth index (results shown in Table  2). Older and female individuals 
Fig. 1  Distribution of poverty score in sample UCs of Malakand and Mardan. This figure shows the 
distribution of poverty scores in the various samples. The overall sample (right panel) includes over-
sampling below and additionally around the cut-off. Sample: BISP sampling frame (N  =  71,591) and 
Household-level sample (panel, N = 1842). Source BISP survey (2010) and Baseline survey (2015). The 
poverty cut-off score (assigned in 2010) determining eligibility for the first phase of the SHPI is 16.17, 
indicated by the vertical red line in each panel. The figure illustrates the degree of two types of oversam-
pling: below and around this cut-off. (Color figure online)
14 We did not ask to specify the medium of transport, so this likely differs across households.
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are consistently more likely to consume inpatient care, where the gender effect 
is driven by childbirth related admissions (effect disappears when childbirth is 
excluded, see Table A.3 in Online Appendix). The results also suggest that poorer 
households consume significantly more inpatient care when using the wealth 
index as proxy for poverty. This is consistent with the fact that both wealth as 
well as health represent outcomes of long-term processes.
The conclusion that in our sample, the less wealthy are more likely to con-
sume inpatient health care, does not necessarily imply that poor households are 
not restricted in their access to health care. Instead, the finding could be driven 
by higher health needs, as health and poverty are related by causality running 
in both directions (Wagstaff 2002). We therefore also check the relation of the 
wealth index with other important outcomes of interest, namely, a measure of 
subjective health status, using a private facility (conditional on being admitted), 
and neglected health care in Table 3. To do so, we repeat the regressions, control-
ling only for the evidently important covariates age and gender, but also including 
squared terms for a more flexible form. The wealth index and its square are cor-
related not only with admission to inpatient care (Column (1)), but also with the 
Table 2  Logit regression of hospitalization on individual and household characteristics, baseline
This table shows the coefficients of logit regressions of a dummy indicating admission to hospital on 
individual and household covariates. Covariates on the left, statistics on top
Sample: Member-level sample (panel, N = 12,852)
Source Baseline survey (2015)
Columns (1), (4), (7) display the coefficient estimates from the logit regressions, Columns (2), (5), (8) 
the standard errors and Columns (3), (6), (9) the p value of the two-sided tests that the coefficient is equal 
to zero, with one of three different proxies for poverty, respectively. Standard errors are adjusted for 24 
clusters in union councils
Table A.3 in Online Appendix contains the results excluding childbirth related hospitalization. The gen-
eral direction and significance of coefficients remains unchanged, but females are no longer significantly 
more likely to be admitted to hospital
Admission to inpatient 
care
Logit 1 Logit 2 Logit 3
Coef. SE p value Coef. SE p value Coef. SE p value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Poverty score 0.004 0.005 0.497
Per capita monthly HH 
income
− 0.009 0.006 0.134
Wealth index − 0.095 0.031 0.002
Female 0.229 0.085 0.007 0.228 0.086 0.008 0.222 0.084 0.008
Age 0.028 0.001 0.000 0.028 0.002 0.000 0.028 0.002 0.000
Household size − 0.025 0.022 0.248 − 0.027 0.021 0.209 − 0.005 0.021 0.815
Hygiene index 0.031 0.040 0.449 0.009 0.040 0.822 − 0.028 0.044 0.532
Dist. to next hospital 
(min)
− 0.002 0.002 0.441 − 0.002 0.002 0.466 − 0.001 0.002 0.523
Const. − 3.643 0.294 0.000 − 3.499 0.217 0.000 − 3.794 0.249 0.000
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subjective health status, which improves for individuals in wealthier households 
(Column 4). Also, wealthier households are more likely to visit a private hospi-
tal (Column 7), where care is frequently perceived to be of higher quality, and 
less likely to report an incident of neglected health care (Column 10).15 Our data 
therefore supports the hypothesis that poor households are indeed restricted in 
their access to health care, both in quantity and perceived quality.
4  Econometric approach
We use two identification strategies, which estimate different effects. First, we apply 
a sharp Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) using the poverty score as run-
ning variable. This provides an estimate of an Intention to Treat (ITT) for observa-
tions around the cut-off. Second, we match insured and non-insured individuals and 
households on the propensity to receive insurance estimated from baseline values. 
This provides an estimate of an Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT). 
Table 4 illustrates the different samples considered for the two estimators.
4.1  Regression discontinuity design (RDD)
We exploit the fact that there exists a pre-defined poverty cut-off score which exo-
geneously determines program eligibility, creating an ideal set-up for an RDD 
approach. Figure 2 depicts the self-reported insurance status by poverty score using 
local polynomial smoothing in both considered districts. In Malakand, there is a 
large and significant drop in insurance enrollment at the cut-off. This drop is smaller 
in Mardan due to a pre-mature roll-out of the second phase, which led to enrollment 
of households with poverty scores between 16.17 and 26.75 in this district, but only 
three months prior to our endline survey. The figure displays the self-reported insur-
ance status, hence also including enrollment under the second phase. Since our main 
outcome of interest, the usage of inpatient care, relates to a period of 12 months, 
it is more appropriate to consider households covered under the second phase as 
(largely) uninsured. We also estimated effects for the second phase in Mardan using 
the cut-off score of 26.75. We find no significant effects, possibly also due to the 
short time period of phase 2 implementation before our survey (max. 3 months) and 
the smaller data set (1232 households overall) in only one district. If anything, this 
should lead to a slight downward attenuation of the estimated affect.16 In our main 
15 The result on the usage of private hospitals shown in the table is obtained by restricting the sample 
to individuals with a case of inpatient care. It also sustains, albeit less pronounced, when running the 
regression on the full sample, unconditional of a case of inpatient care.
16 For a quick back-of-the-envelop calculation, note that the effect in our model is reduced approxi-
mately by the average time the control group was covered (estimated as 2/12 months) times the share of 
recently insured individuals above the cut-off (0.4 across both districts) over the share of insured below 
the cut-off (0.67), so by around 10%.
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model specification we hence calculate intention-to-treat effects using a sharp RDD 
design with treatment determined by the poverty score only.
While the poverty score is assigned on household level, we measure key vari-
ables of interest on member level and use the member-level sample for estimation 
of effects on these. Potentially, all members of insured households were eligible to 
be insured, and since we focus on intention-to-treat effects here, we also use the 
poverty score as treatment indicator on member level. Figure B.2 in Online Appen-
dix depicts the share of insured individuals in the member-level sample by poverty 
score for the two districts, essentially showing the same drop in the propensity to be 
insured.
We calculate local linear regression models to the left and right of the cut-off 
score using a triangular kernel, where the bandwidth is estimated to minimize the 
mean squared error as suggested in Calonico et  al. (2017). We provide standard 
errors using heteroskedasticity-robust nearest neighbor variance estimators as pro-
vided by the Stata command rdrobust by the same authors.
The key assumption for the internal validity of the RDD approach is that the 
distributions of potential outcomes are smooth around the cut-off score. As this 
assumption is not directly testable, we in the following show different tests that 
underline the credibility of this main assumption.
4.1.1  No manipulation of poverty scores
An important assumption for the validity of RDD is that of no self-selection. In our 
setting, this implies that, while households might be able to manipulate the pov-
erty score, they must be unable to precisely sort around the cut-off score (McCrary 
2008). In general, self-selection is a threat if individuals are aware of the assign-
ment rule, expect positive returns of participation in treatment and have sufficient 
time and resources to change their behavior to meet the assignment rule. To assess 
this risk in our setting, note that the poverty score was initially derived to determine 
eligibility to a nation-wide social program, the Benazir Income Support Program 
(BISP), and assigned to each household in 2010, long before the SHPI came to life. 
Since the BISP used the same cut-off score as the SHPI, this might have created an 
incentive for self-sorting into treatment. However, the poverty score is based on a 
proxy means test constructed from a scorecard with 23 variables. Households knew 
neither how the information was to be aggregated into a single poverty score nor 
was the cut-off score known in advance but set so as to cover the poorest 21% of the 
population in the program (Uddin et al. 2013).
More formally, we can test for discontinuities in the density of the poverty score 
at the cut-off. Cattaneo et  al. (2020) provide a fully data driven approach to test 
for a discontinuity. When running this test for the random sample, we obtain insig-
nificant results (T = 0.844, p value = 0.398), see Fig. B.4 in Online Appendix, sug-
gesting that there was no manipulation of the poverty score. This is in line with the 
work of Ambler and De Brauw (2017) and Nawaz and Iqbal (2021), who also use 
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Table 4  Treatment and control groups in two estimators
This table illustrates the different samples considered for the regression discontinuity design and propen-
sity score matching estimators, respectively
Treatment group Control group
Regression discontinu-
ity design (RDD)
Insured and uninsured HH/members from two pilot 
districts
Poverty score ∈ [16.17 − B, 16.17]
Insured and uninsured 
HH/members from two 
pilot districts
Poverty score 
∈ [16.17, 16.17 + B]
Propensity score match-
ing (PSM)
Insured HH/members from two pilot districts
Poverty scores ∈ [0, 16.17]
Uninsured HH/members 
from two pilot districts
Poverty scores 
∈ [0, 16.17]
Fig. 2  Share of households insured (self-reported) by poverty score. This figure shows the average 
insurance rate, conditional on the poverty score. The solid blue lines and shaded grey areas are the pre-
dicted values and associated 95%-confidence intervals, respectively, based on local mean smoothing. 
The red vertical line indicates the cut-off score of 16.17. Sample: Household-level RDD sample (panel, 
NMalakand = 617, NMardan = 1232 ). Source Endline survey (2017). (Color figure online)
17 Ambler and De Brauw (2017) also use the undersmoothed estimators, which also brings insignificant 
results in our sample. We also run the Cattaneo et al. (2020) test on our member-level sample and obtain 
insignificant results. In addition, the density test proposed by McCrary (2008) also fails to detect a sig-
nificant discontinuity.
an RDD with the same poverty score in Pakistan and run the same tests on their 
samples.17 The result is also supported by the report on the initial targeting survey 
of the national social program, which also finds no sharp break in the density of the 
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poverty score and no significant jump at the threshold for baseline covariates and 
outcome variables (OLeary et al. 2011).18
4.1.2  Confounding program
As mentioned above, the poverty score also determines eligibility to another social 
program, which includes an unconditional cash transfer. The program has been run-
ning since 2010 and was ongoing at the time of our survey. Most importantly, it 
uses the same cut-off score as the SHPI, which might lead to confounding effects. In 
fact, 84% of eligible households in our panel claim to have received transfers from 
the BISP program. However, the transfer was small (10% reporting 1000 PK and 
another 85% reporting 1500 PKR) and, most importantly, 80% of all households 
claim to have received these transfers already at baseline. We can therefore test 
whether the program had any effect on the outcomes considered in our study by esti-
mating pseudo effects at baseline. Table 5 and Fig. 3 contain the results. We find no 
significant effects in any of the outcomes of interest, proving that the national social 
program does not confound our analysis. Table B.5 contains the pseudo effects at 
baseline for any subgroup considered in analysis of heterogeneous effects.
4.1.3  Continuity of covariates
Another test that is often run in similar studies is to check for continuity of covari-
ates around the cut-off that could affect the outcome of interest. It is not a necessary 
condition for the continuity of potential outcomes, but it increases its plausibility. 
Regarding the choice of variables to assess, note that our running variable, the pov-
erty score, is an unknown function (f) of some socio-demographic and economic 
covariates (X). In particular with discrete covariates, any specific value of f(X) might 
only be attainable by a specific combination of X, such that similar but distinct val-
ues of f(X) can only be attained by very different combinations of X. In this case, 
E[xi|f ] becomes a non-smooth function, such that there might necessarily be discon-
tinuities at the cut-off as well as many other points. As plausibility check, we there-
fore only test for discontinuities in variables which were not used to construct the 
poverty score. Table B.4 in Online Appendix shows that no significant discontinuity 
can be detected in any of these cases.
Regarding those covariates that were used to construct the poverty score, such 
as age, gender, and wealth, we believe the continuity of baseline outcomes (shown 
above) to be sufficient evidence for the continuity of potential outcomes around the 
cut-off, and hence the validity of the RDD approach. Nevertheless, we include the 
18 The density test estimated in our overall estimation sample renders a test statistic of − 3.209 with a p 
value of 0.0013. The highly significant jump in the density is however due to our sampling strategy with 
a larger share of oversampling below than above the cut-off score.
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covariates age, gender, and wealth in our regressions and find point estimates to be 
slightly larger in magnitude. Since inference remains however unaffected, we provide 
the more conservative estimates excluding covariates as main results and estimates 
controlling for covariates as robustness checks in Table C.13 in Online Appendix. 
Further pseudo-effect calculations on those covariates not used for calculating the 
poverty score give insignificant results, see Table B.10 in Online Appendix.
4.1.4  Further specification and falsification tests
To check robustness to tuning parameters, we estimate various specification tests: 
we cluster standard errors at UC-level, include covariates, apply a fuzzy design, use 
local constant regression models as well as polynomial order three, apply a uniform 
and an epanechnikov kernel, allow MSE-optimal bandwidth to differ below and 
above the cut-off, choose the bandwidth that optimizes the coverage error rate, and 
use the bandwidth estimators suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Our 
results are robust regarding these different specifications, as shown in Tables C.11 
and C.12 in Online Appendix.
We furthermore run an algorithm applying a series of pseudo cut-off scores in 
0.1-steps from 14.69 to 17.69 on our four main outcome variables. Of the 116 thus 
calculated pseudo estimates, only three are significant at the 5% level, and none at 
the 1%.
Finally, we collapse our member-level sample by household and repeat our esti-
mation regarding member-based outcomes on indicator variables on household 
level. This way we account for the fact that the poverty score was assigned on house-
hold, not individual level. Our results are robust to this aggregation, as shown in 
Table D.14 in Online Appendix.
4.2  Propensity score matching (PSM)
Whereas the regression discontinuity design has a high internal validity, its external 
validity is restricted to households and individuals around the cut-off. To also esti-
mate average treatment effects on all treated, we supplement our analysis using a 
propensity score matching approach. This is possible because among eligible house-
holds, the program achieved self-reported enrollment rates of 65.2% of households. 
This is remarkably high,19 yet a sizable number of households targeted by the pro-
gram did not report themselves insured in our survey, likely due to imperfections in 
program roll-out.
Two aspects on the definition of our treatment indicator are important to note. 
First, we make use of the self-reported insurance status, instead of the official status 
as per administrative data. We believe that households which are officially insured 
but not aware of this are more likely to behave as if they were uninsured and should 
19 As comparison, Banerjee et al. (2019) report enrollment rates of 8% in the Indonesian national health 
insurance program of their study, which they managed to increase to 30% under a treatment arm with full 
premium subsidization and assistance in the enrollment process.
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Table 5  Pseudo-effects on 
inpatient care consumption at 
baseline
The bold values are the estimates, the italic values the number of 
observations. This is to differentiate between the important numbers 
(bold) and the supplementary numbers (italic)
This table shows results from RDD estimates on baseline variables, 
main outcome variables on the left, the different statistics on top
Sample: RDD sample (panel, varying N)
 Source Baseline survey (2015)
Columns (1) and (2) show the coefficient and standard errors for the 
pseudo-intention-to-treat effect for households just below the cut-off 
score, estimated using a sharp regression discontinuity design. Esti-
mated using local linear regression models with a triangular kernel 
and bandwidth estimated to minimize the mean squared error; S.E. 
as proposed in Calonico et  al. (2014) (corresponding to our main 
model specification). Reported sample size refers to observations 
within selected bandwidth
The statistical significance is given as follows: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, 







 Usage of inpatient care 0.001 0.008
  N (left/right of cut-off) 3217/2557
Conditional on usage of inpatient care
 More than one admittance 0.006 0.080
  N (left/right of cut-off) 134/125
 Usage of private vs public hospitals 0.021 0.079
  N (left/right of cut-off) 161/132
Household outcomes
 Neglected health care −  0.011 0.030
  N (left/right of cut-off) 418/361
Fig. 3  Inpatient care by poverty 
score at baseline. This figure 
shows the share of individu-
als with a case of inpatient 
care by poverty score, using 
local polynomial smoothing. 
Red vertical line indicates the 
cut-off score of 16.17. Sample: 
Member-level random sample 
(panel, N = 12,863).  Source 
Baseline survey (2015). (Color 
figure online)
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hence be part of the control group.20 For ease of notation, we will use the term (un-)
insured to refer to the self-reported insurance status from now on. Second, for esti-
mating effects on individual level, we identify all members of an insured household 
as insured. Whereas in our survey, we ask for the insurance status of each house-
hold member individually, we find comparably high rates of false-positive and false-
negative reporting. Initially, seven members of a household could enroll under the 
insurance, but this changed to eight members when Phase 2 was rolled out. In our 
complete sample, 28% of households with more than eight members claim that all 
are covered under the insurance, whereas only 78% of households with seven mem-
bers or less report all members covered. The latter number increases to 91% if “do 
not know” answers are counted as enrolled. In the absence of administrative data for 
individuals we cannot further investigate the reasons for this. However, the fact that 
the “do not know” answer was chosen for 15.94% of the household members indi-
cates that there might be substantial recall bias.
We exploit the fact that a third of the target households remain uninsured, and 
estimate the ATT using the following propensity score matching estimator:
where PSM is the statistic of interest, the average treatment effect on the treated. 
I1 is the set of insured households within the region of common support, I0 is the 
set of uninsured households, Y1i is the outcome for an insured household, Y0j for an 
uninsured household, Pj = Prj(insured|Z) is the propensity score, i.e., the probabil-
ity that a household is insured conditional on a set of covariates Z, G() is the epane-
chnikov kernel, Bn the bandwidth. As was the case in the RDD, we also estimate 
effects on individual level, in which case I1 is the set of individuals in insured house-
holds within the region of common support, I0 is the set of individuals in uninsured 
households, Y1i is the outcome for members in an insured household, Y0j for a mem-
ber in an uninsured household, Pj = Prj(insured|Z) is the propensity score, i.e. here, 
the probability that an individual is member of an insured household conditional 
on a set of covariates Z. Note that for each sample we consider (household, mem-
ber, conditional, or subsamples thereof for the analysis of heterogeneous effects) we 
estimate the propensity scores anew and for this purpose re-run the algorithm that 
selects the set of covariates Z described below. That is, the set of covariates used for 






















20 Only 2.5% of ineligible households who report themselves insured in our survey are not insured 
according to administrative data. In contrast, 74.4% of eligible households who report themselves unin-
sured are registered as insured in administrative data. The numbers are in line with programs in other 
countries such as Philippines and Rwanda, where Lagomarsino et  al. (2012) note that Government 
enrollment figures do not always match household survey data. In our case, three factors likely contribute 
to the deviance: (i) The household never received the card and the administrative data are fraudulent. 
(ii) The household was enrolled after our endline survey. (iii) The household was enrolled, but the inter-
viewed household member was not aware of it.
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For the calculation of standard errors we account for the fact that propensity 
scores are estimated and that variables are clustered on the union council level by 
providing clustered bootstrapped standard errors (9999 repetitions).21 Note that we 
bootstrap the whole process of estimating propensity scores, imposing common sup-
port, matching observations, and estimating effects.
Two assumptions are key to this approach (Todd 2010): Conditional mean inde-
pendence and common support, which we discuss in the following.
4.2.1  Common support
To ensure common support, we restrict our treatment sample to individuals or 
households with a propensity score above the 99th percentile score among the con-
trol group, as suggested in Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008). This eliminates 10.23% 
of households and 5.53% of household members in our respective treatment groups, 
for whom we have no suitable control observations. Furthermore, there are some 
gaps in the density of propensity scores in the control group. This is no concern 
though, as we have sufficient density to the left and right of these gaps for kernel 
matching. Nevertheless, we follow Smith and Todd (2005) and additionally drop 1% 
of our treatment observations at which the propensity score density of the control 
group is at its lowest. Figures B.7 and B.8 in Online Appendix demonstrate that 
common support is thus sufficiently ensured.22
4.2.2  Conditional mean independence
Whether the conditional mean independence assumption is fulfilled is not directly 
testable, but hinges on the considered set Z for calculating propensity scores (Smith 
and Todd 2005). The lowest bias arises when Z includes all variables that simulta-
neously affect insurance status and considered outcomes. We see three factors that 
are important here: Non-random targeting (e.g. due to infrastructure or social sta-
tus), non-random acceptance of the card (e.g. due to lack of education or trust in the 
government), and non-random awareness of having received a card (e.g. due to low 
valuation or knowledge about insurance). Any of these three systematic differences 
between insured and uninsured households is probably driven by a number of unob-
servable variables, such as geographic accessibility, quality of accessible health care, 
intensity of the awareness campaign, quality of education, or interviewer effects. 
Many of these are however likely to be geographically clustered. Indeed, enrollment 
rates in our sample of eligible households range from 40 to 80% in the 24 union 
councils of the two districts, as depicted in Fig.  4.23 Correspondingly, we tested 
21 Whereas Abadie and Imbens (2008) show that bootstrapping is invalid for nearest neighbor matching, 
they anticipate that the bootstrap is valid for kernel-based matching (which we use) due to its asymptotic 
linearity.
22 We concentrate on estimation of average treatment effects on the treated, hence we need not drop con-
trol observations for whom there is no match in the treatment group.
23 Union councils are administrative units between the district and village level, which also served as 
survey clusters (second stage sampling unit).
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whether the set of union council dummies contributes to explaining enrollment and 
find this to be the case (p value of an f test testing joint significance = 0.001). There-
fore, we include the set of union council dummies in our set of covariates used to 
estimate propensity scores in our main model specification.
Other variables that might affect both, insurance status and outcomes, such as 
education, prior insurance knowledge or household size, are observable to us from 
the baseline survey. Tables B.6 and B.7 in Online Appendix show means of all col-
lected baseline variables for insured and uninsured households. Along observable 
dimensions, the two groups differ significantly only in their willingness to take 
financial risks, with the uninsured households being more willing to bear risks. 
This is in line with the theory that risk-averse individuals have a higher incentive to 
seek insurance coverage. As Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) note, omitting impor-
tant variables can increase the bias in the estimates, which suggests including as 
many covariates as possible. However, over-parameterized models suffer from a 
lack of common support, which potentially increases the variance of the propensity 
score estimate. To balance the risk of bias and variance, we follow the algorithm 
described in Imbens and Rubin (2015, Chap. 13) for our main model specification. 
For this algorithm, we select a set of base variables, which we believe important 
for the selection model.24 The algorithm searches for further baseline variables to 
be included linearly into the selection model in an iterative process, where in each 
step the variable yielding the largest likelihood ratio statistic is included in the 
model, until all these statistics are smaller than one. The iterative process leads us 
to include an additional ten variables on household and four variables on member 
level. Finally, we select quadratic and interaction terms of all selected variables to be 
included into the selection model using the same iterative process as before.25 This 
time, we stop when all likelihood ratio statistics are smaller than 2.7, as in Imbens 
and Rubin (2015). This leads us to include another 20 interaction terms on house-
hold and 23 terms on member level. In conclusion, in our main model specification, 
we match households on 36 and individuals on 40 linear and interaction baseline 
variables in addition to union council dummies. We repeat the same variable selec-
tion algorithm for any subsample analysis.
Tables B.6 and B.7 in Online Appendix demonstrate the achieved balancing on 
union councils and baseline variables. Figures B.5 and B.6 in Online Appendix show 
the distribution of the poverty score among insured and matched uninsured samples, 
underlining the credibility of the conditional mean independence assumption.
24 In addition to the union council dummies, we chose the poverty score, the average monthly household 
income (winsorized), the household size, household-level usage of inpatient care (extensive margin and 
number of household members treated), as well as the minimum of the reported health status over all 
household members for the household-level sample. On member level, the set additionally includes age, 
gender, subjective health status, admittance to hospital (whether admitted at all and whether admitted 
more than once), and dummy variables for whether the member completed primary school and whether 
the member completed senior or higher education.
25 We refrain from including interactions with the union council dummies, as this would lead to overfit-
ting, violating the common support assumption.
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4.2.3  Additional model specifications
To test the sensitivity of our propensity score estimates regarding the set of covar-
iates Z, we additionally estimate propensity scores using (a) variables selected by 
the Imbens algorithm without pre-selecting any variables for inclusion, (b) only 
the pre-selected variables and UC-dummies, (c) the variables selected by the 
Imbens algorithm but without UC-dummies, and d) linear and interaction vari-
ables selected using lasso methods with crossvalidation. Tables B.8 and B.9 in 
Online Appendix show the number of variables selected in each of these specifi-
cations and the log likelihood function using probit estimation. In both datasets, 
the latter is maximized using the set of covariates from our main model specifica-
tion. The tables furthermore show the correlation coefficients of the log odds ratio 
of propensity scores calculated using our main model and the four other specifi-
cations. The correlation with other specifications is lowest for the set selected 
using lasso methods and the set of pre-selected variables and UC-dummies. We 
therefore also estimate effects using these model specifications. Results remain 
however unchanged, as illustrated in Table C.13 in Online Appendix.
4.2.4  Further robustness and falsification tests
To check robustness, we cluster standard errors on household-level and we restrict 
estimation to the random sample. Our results are robust regarding these differ-
ent specifications, see Table C.13 in Online Appendix. Furthermore, we apply 
augmented inverse-probability weighted regression estimation. For this doubly 
robust method, we specify an outcome as well as a treatment model. Whereas 
the latter corresponds to the model we use for propensity score estimation (i.e. 
covariates selected using the Imbens algorithm for each subset), the outcome 
model is inspired by Table  3 in that we include covariates that were correlated 
Fig. 4  Enrollment rates in main 
sample of eligible households 
across 24 union councils. This 
figure shows the enrollment 
rates per union council in the 
two pilot districts Malakand and 
Mardan. Sample: Household-
level PSM sample (panel, 
N = 795). Source Endline 
survey (2017). Union councils 
are geo-administrative units two 
levels below the district which 
served as sampling clusters 
(second stage sampling unit)
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with the outcomes at baseline.26 Our results are robust to this alternative estima-
tion method.
5  Results
5.1  Main results
Our main outcome variables concern the use of inpatient care. In our endline survey, 
we asked for each household member separately whether that member experienced 
a case of inpatient care in the past 12 months (admittance to hospital). If answer-
ing affirmatively, we also asked how often the individual was admitted to hospital 
within that timeframe, and what type of hospital she visited (private vs public). Fur-
thermore, on household level we asked whether any household member faced an 
accident or illness where inpatient care was considered but not sought within the 
past 12 months (neglected health care). For all these four key outcomes, we estimate 
the effects of providing insurance coverage using both, the Regression Discontinuity 
Design (RDD) and as supplementary estimates Propensity Score Matching (PSM).
Table 6 contains the results from the RDD and the PSM estimations. For exam-
ple, in the first line the outcome considered is whether an individual has sought 
inpatient care in the past 12 months. The mean among the matched control group in 
the PSM sample is 0.059 and we estimate a negative and insignificant coefficient of 
− 0.002 in the PSM estimation, with a standard error of 0.011. The sample consists 
of 2526 uninsured and 3638 insured household members. Our RDD estimation also 
yields a coefficient of − 0.002 with a standard error of 0.007, where we rely on 3118 
observations below and 2526 observations above the cut-off. Note that the reported 
sample size refers to the area of common support (PSM sample) and the observa-
tions within the selected bandwidth around the cut-off score (RDD sample) respec-
tively, implying that these numbers change across regression specifications.
Despite the large number of observations at our disposition, we find no signifi-
cant effects of the program on the usage of inpatient care, neither locally around 
the cut-off (RDD) nor averaged across all treated (PSM). Even when accounting for 
clustering effects, standard errors are limited to one percentage point, such that we 
would have detected effect sizes of less than two percentage points as significant 
(one third of the control mean). There are also no effects when analyzing the cor-
responding outcomes on household level, i.e., considering as outcomes either the 
propensity that any member in a given household is admitted to hospital or the num-
ber of household members admitted, see Table D.14 in Online Appendix. In other 
words, we can exclude short-term transformative changes in seeking hospitalization 
in our sample.
26 That is, we regress the usage of inpatient care on wealth index, gender and age; the variables more 
than one admittance and usage of private hospitals on wealth and gender, and the variable neglected 
health care on wealth and squared wealth index.
 The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review
Among individuals who reported a case of inpatient care, we also look at the 
share of individuals with more than one stay at a hospital and also find no effect 
here. As we did not find an effect of the program on the probability of using any 
inpatient care before, we believe in the validity of this result, even though the sam-
ple restriction to those with inpatient care might in principle be endogenous. Fur-
thermore, note that our sample size is much smaller here.27
We also do not observe a decrease in the share of households with neglected 
health care. Again, precision of the coefficients is limited, but both the RDD as well 
as the PSM point estimates are very close to zero. Note that 90% of households 
reporting a case of neglected health care stated that this was because they could not 
afford the cost of treatment in a hospital, suggesting that a functioning insurance 
scheme could have had an impact on this variable.
Suggestive evidence in line with these null effects also comes from households 
with childbirth. Given that the insurance explicitly covers maternity care, we would 
expect a particularly strong increase in the usage of professional assistance during 
childbirth in these households. Unfortunately, there are too few childbirths in our 
sample to run a proper matching procedure, but a simple comparison of beneficiary 
groups in the RDD and PSM samples does not reveal any significant differences.28
While the quantity of inpatient care consumed seems to remain largely 
unchanged, usage patterns may nevertheless have changed. Specifically, we find a 
significant increase in the usage of private vs public hospitals in the RDD estimation 
as illustrated in Fig. 5. This result is robust against different bandwidth specifica-
tions, as illustrated in Fig. 6, and also holds when analyzing the result on household 
level, see Table D.14 in Online Appendix.
In addition, the effect of 6.8 percentage points calculated in the PSM estimation 
is, albeit insignificant, sizeable and in the expected direction, increasing the share of 
individuals visiting a private instead of a public hospital by 18.06%. This result is in 
line with administrative data: In their progress report for January to June 2017, the 
consultancy supporting the program on behalf of the KfW Development Bank notes 
that 95.59% of admissions in the two districts were registered in private hospitals 
(Oxford Policy Management 2017).29 We draw further descriptive evidence from 
a separate section of the questionnaire, where we asked households whether they 
have used the card, at what type of hospital, and whether this was the first time they 
visited that facility. Among respondents who used their card at a private facility, 
27 To avoid overfitting, we therefore repeat the calculation of propensity scores for this subsample and 
include only linear terms and no interaction terms in the estimation model.
28 We have 113 cases of childbirth within a 2-points interval around the cut-off score. Yet, the RDD esti-
mation also does not find a significant effect on the usage or professional assistance at childbirth. In our 
PSM sample, we observe only 35 uninsured and 80 insured households with childbirth, and this sample 
size is not sufficient to ensure common support for PSM estimation. Regressing the use of professional 
assistance during childbirth on the insurance status among the PSM sample yields no significant result.
29 At the time of our study, the program had empanelled seven private and four public hospitals in the 
two districts, and for each private facility there is one public facility in immediate proximity (Oxford 
Policy Management 2017).
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79.45% visited this facility for the first time, compared to only 36.67% among public 
facility card users.
The shift from public to private hospitals constitutes an improvement of health 
for the beneficiaries if and only if private hospitals provide better quality of care. 
However, whereas public hospitals are hardly monitored, private hospitals do not 
Table 6  Effects on inpatient care consumption
The bold values are the estimates, the italic values the number of observations. This is to differentiate 
between the important numbers (bold) and the supplementary numbers (italic)
This table shows our main results, the effect of free hospitalization insurance on inpatient care consump-
tion. Outcome variables on the left, different econometric models and statistics on top
Samples: Member-level and household-level PSM and RDD samples (panel, varying N)
Source Endline survey (2017)
Column (1) displays the mean for the matched controls of uninsured, but eligible households (poverty 
score below 16.17). Columns (2) and (3) show the coefficient and standard error for the average treat-
ment effect on the treated, estimated using propensity score kernel matching. Columns (4) and (5) show 
the coefficient and standard errors for the intention-to-treat effect for households just below the cut-off 
score of 16.17, estimated using a sharp regression discontinuity design
Note on PSM SE are derived by bootstrapping the whole process of estimation of propensity scores, 
restricting the sample to common support, matching, and ATT estimation. Unit of clustering is the union 
council. Number of bootstraps: 9999. Reported sample size refers to area of common support (overall 
sample size: 795 households with 6007 members). Table C.13 in Online Appendix contains results of 
various robustness checks. Inference remains unchanged across various alternative specifications
Note on RDD Estimated using local linear regression models with a triangular kernel and bandwidth esti-
mated to minimize the mean squared error; SE as proposed in Calonico et al. (2014). Reported sample 
size refers to observations within selected bandwidth (overall sample size: 1842 households with 12,862 
members). Table C.11 in Online Appendix contains results of various robustness checks. Inference 
remains unchanged across various alternative specifications
The statistical significance is given as follows: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01, with the null 
hypothesis of the two-sided test being a zero effect size






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Individual outcomes
 Usage of inpatient care 0.059 −  0.002 0.011  − 0.002 0.007
  N (uninsured/insured, left/right of cut-off) 2526/3638 4336/3227
Conditional on usage of inpatient care
 More than one admittance 0.195 0.022 0.077 0.062 0.054
  N (uninsured/insured, left/right of cut-off) 107/212 255/174
Usage of private vs public hospitals 0.383 0.068 0.075 0.237*** 0.073
  N (uninsured/insured, left/right of cut-off) 101/202 186/131
Household outcomes
 Neglected health care 0.062 0.007 0.026 0.001 0.022
    N (uninsured/insured, left/right of cut-off) 277/461 581/466
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even register, rendering it notoriously difficult to measure quality of care.30 Though 
private hospitals seem to perform better regarding governance and resources, it is 
unclear whether this transforms into better health outcomes, as private hospitals may 
overtreat common diseases while referring difficult cases to public tertiary hospi-
tals.31 Nevertheless, suggestive evidence comes from our baseline survey, where we 
asked respondents to rate the health status of household members with a case of 
inpatient care at the worst time of their illness, before, and after hospitalization on 
Fig. 5  RDD plot for use of 
private vs public hospitals. This 
figure illustrates the result for 
the impact of the insurance the 
insurance on the use of private 
vs public hospitals. Small 
confidence intervals in the bins 
just above and below the cut-
off score reflect our sampling 
strategy. Sample: Member-level 
RDD sample with case of inpa-
tient care (panel, Ntotal = 742).  
Source Baseline survey (2015)
Fig. 6  RDD estimates for use 
of private vs public hospitals, 
different bandwidths. This figure 
shows the point estimates and 
confidence intervals for the 
impact of the insurance on the 
use of private vs public hos-
pitals for different bandwidths 
and accounting for clustering on 
household level. Main specifica-
tion uses bandwidth of 3.71. 
Sample: Member-level RDD 
sample with case of inpatient 
care (panel, varying sample 
size depending on bandwidth).  
Source Baseline survey (2015)
30 A recent assessment of hospitals in the province of KP led by the Asian Development Bank paints a 
rather daunting picture of health care quality, listing among other challenges political interference and 
corrupt practices, serious lack of space, workforce, and drug supplies, as well as issues related to infec-
tion control (ADB 2019). The review comprised 37 hospitals, including two private ones, and while this 
is hardly a representative review of the private sector, the described governance challenges related to 
nepotism and corruption are likely to be dominant in the public sector.
31 We find no evidence for this in our data. Whereas the diseases treated in public and private hospitals 
are similar, the number of cases per diseases and type of hospital might be too low to detect significant 
differences.
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a scale of 1 to 5. Regressing the health status after hospitalization on whether a pri-
vate hospital was chosen yiels a significant and positive coefficient even when con-
trolling for health status before hospitalization. This relation is illustrated in Fig. 7.
Moreover, 65.82% of respondents in our PSM sample rather agreed than disa-
greed with the statement that private facilities provide better quality of service than 
public facilities in the endline survey.32 Most importantly, as we have laid out in 
Sect. 3, wealthier clients are significantly more likely to visit private hospitals. Spe-
cifically, 17.93% of individuals with a case of inpatient care in the lowest wealth 
quintile visited a private hospital at baseline, whereas that share increases to 44.87% 
in the highest wealth quintile. We can reasonably assume that individuals would not 
be willing to pay higher prices in private hospitals if these were not at least per-
ceived to provide better care. Therefore, we associate the observed behavior change 
in provider choice caused by the insurance with an increase in subjective quality of 
care.
Fig. 7  Average drop in health by provider choice. This figure shows the difference between the health 
status before the illness that led to hospitalization and after hospitalization (left panel), respectively at 
baseline (right panel). On average, the health status worsened after hospitalization, but private hospitals 
restored health to a higher level than public hospitals. Sample: Conditional sample (baseline, N = 508).  
Source Baseline survey (2015)
32 Shabbir and Malik (2016) provide further circumstantial evidence by finding patients of private hospi-
tals in Islamabad to be more satisfied than patients of public hospitals.
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5.2  Heterogeneous effects
Average treatment effects might mask heterogeneity regarding demographic or 
socio-economic characteristics. We therefore repeat the estimation of treatment 
effects on our main outcome variable, the propensity to use any inpatient care, for 
selected subsamples with particularly high health financing needs.33 We look at 
female household members, at adults above the age of 16, at members with self-
rated health status below median at baseline (i.e., below perfect health), and at 
households with below-median wealth.34 Table 7 contains the results of the subsam-
ple analysis. We find no significant effects for any of the four subgroups. Note that 
the control mean in the overall PSM sample was 0.059, underlining that the sub-
groups considered here are the high-risk groups.
6  Discussion
In this section, we discuss our finding of shifts towards private care without an 
increase in overall hospitalization. Let us first emphasize that the RDD and PSM 
approaches meaningfully complement each other, because they allow us to look at 
effects on two different populations (intention-to-treat effect at the cutoff vs aver-
age treatment effect on the treated), and thereby provide a more complete picture.35 
Also, they complement each other in overcoming relative weaknesses. For example, 
the RDD estimate is based on an exogeneous eligibility cutoff, which might be a less 
noisy measure of ‘effective’ coverage than self-reported insurance status. However, 
in a context of imperfect rollout and awareness, it is also valuable to have the PSM 
estimates, which are based on self-reported enrollment, to confirm results.
One important aspect in the interpretation of the findings is that the endline sur-
vey took place 12 to 15 months after the distribution of insurance cards. This might 
be too short for results to materialize, for example, because households might need 
longer to change behavior, or because hospitals might need longer to set up the 
required procedures. Whereas we agree that the program likely needed more time 
to reach its full potential, we do not believe that inertness to change behavior is the 
main reason for this in this setting.36 In line with this, absolute claim numbers in our 
33 Note that for the other outcomes analyzed before, subsample analyses suffer from the limited number 
of observations.
34 For these subsamples, we calculate pseudo RDD-effects at baseline to check the plausibility of the 
RDD assumptions. There are no significant effects, as illustrated in Table B.5. For the PSM estimation, 
we calculate propensity scores based on covariates Zj , which are selected anew for each subsample from 
the set of all baseline covariates following the Imbens algorithm.
35 Note that we do not focus on the validity of the assumptions underlying our empirical approach here. 
Those are discussed in Sect. 4, where we present supporting evidence as far as possible. Specifically, we 
test the assumptions wherever our data allows, conduct a range of plausibility and sensitivity tests (see 
Tables C.11 and C.13 in Online Appendix), and run placebo analyses using baseline variables, alterna-
tive cut-offs, and control districts.
36 At baseline, 72% of households with a case of outpatient care four weeks prior to our survey received 
this care at a (public or private) hospitals. Households are hence familiar with hospital visits and the 
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two study districts reach relatively stable levels within the first two to three months 
of insurance introduction and only increase after the second phase of the program is 
introduced (around the timing of the endline survey). We illustrate this fact in Fig. 8, 
where we plot the number of claims in the two districts respectively as per admin-
istrative data of the program. Note that Phase 2 started at different points of time in 
the two districts and saw a notable increase of enrollment from 21% of the popula-
tion to 51%.
The overwhelming majority of these claims come from private providers, in 
line with our finding of an increased propensity to visit private rather than public 
Table 7  Hetereogeneous effects on usage of inpatient care
The bold values are the estimates, the italic values the number of observations. This is to differentiate 
between the important numbers (bold) and the supplementary numbers (italic)
This table shows heterogeneous effects of hospitalization insurance on the usage of inpatient care. The 
different subgroups considered are indicated on the left, econometric models and statistics on top
Samples: Subgroups of the PSM and RDD samples (panel, varying N)
Source Endline survey (2017)
Column (1) displays the mean for the matched controls of uninsured, but eligible households (poverty 
score below 16.17). Columns (2) and (3) show the coefficient and standard error for the average treat-
ment effect on the treated, estimated using propensity score kernel matching. Columns (4) and (5) show 
the coefficient and standard errors for the intention-to-treat effect for households just below the cut-off 
poverty score of 16.17 estimated using a sharp regression discontinuity design
Note on PSM SE are derived by bootstrapping the whole process of estimation of propensity scores, 
restricting the sample to common support, matching and ATT estimation. Unit of clustering is the union 
council. Number of bootstraps: 9999. Reported sample size refers to area of common support @publish-
ing services Please add line brakes suggest by the authors
Note on RDD Estimated using local linear regression models with a triangular kernel and bandwidth 
estimated to minimize the mean squared error; SE as proposed in Calonico et al. (2014). Reported sam-
ple size refers to observations within selected bandwidth. The statistical significance is given as follows: 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01, with the null hypothesis being a zero effect size






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female household members 0.064 0.005 0.013  0.004 0.012
 N (uninsured/insured, left/right of cut-off)  1017/1740  1633/1253
Adults above 16 years 0.097 −  0.020 0.022 − 0.021 0.014
 N (uninsured/insured, left/right of cut-off) 1051/1823 1584/1266
Baseline health status below median (< 5) 0.093 −  0.002 0.017  − 0.000 0.015
N (uninsured/insured, left/right of cut-off) 825/1281 1419/1108
Wealth index below median (< −0.60) 0.079  − 0.015 0.023  − 0.002 0.114
N (uninsured/insured, left/right of cut-off)  1065/1772 1574/1362
required behavioral change is smaller than it might be in settings with a functioning primary health care 
system.
Footnote 36 (continued)
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hospitals. A plausible explanation might be that public hospitals were slow to imple-
ment required procedures and hence effective coverage was only provided in private 
hospitals. In fact, private hospitals might have faced greater incentives to participate 
in the program as the insurance allowed them to attract clients who could previ-
ously not afford their services, while at the same time possessing a more flexible 
governance structure. We therefore cannot reject the possibility of supply side con-
straints in the public sector driving the observed change in provider choice. This is 
a relevant consideration as it illustrates the importance of empaneling private health 
care providers in large-scale programs with potential public capacity limitations. We 
have to keep in mind, however, that despite the apparent capacity to absorb patients 
in private facilities, we do not observe an increase in overall inpatient care consump-
tion. This prompts the question whether there are other bottlenecks in the new health 
insurance scheme.
One possibility is that a lack of information restricts beneficiaries from effectively 
using the insurance. Given that the government pays full premiums to the insurer 
based on insurance cards distributed, and that the costs faced by the insurer are driven 
by actual usage, the insurer has little incentive to provide comprehensive informa-
tion to facilitate utilization. Information provided by the regional NGOs might also 
be incomplete in this principal-agent setting. Our endline survey contains knowledge 
questions about the insurance program, in particular which treatments are covered 
(inpatient and/or outpatient) and which hospitals would accept the card (public and/
Fig. 8  Absolute number of claims over time (admin data). This figure shows the absolute number 
of claims per district over the first one and a half years of the program. Source Administrative data of 
the SHPI program. Red lines indicate the start of Phase 2 in the respective districts (December 2016 
in Mardan, April 2017 in Malakand) and black lines the timing of the baseline and follow-up surveys. 
(Color figure online)
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Table 8  Evidence on program limitations
The bold values are the estimates, the italic values the number of observations. This is to differentiate 
between the important numbers (bold) and the supplementary numbers (italic)
This table shows evidence for the discussion on program limitations. Different subgroups (Panel A) or 
outcomes variables (Panel B) on the left, statistics on top
Samples: (Subsamples of) PSM sample and RDD sample (panel, varying N)
Source Endline survey (2017)
Column (1) displays the mean for the matched controls of uninsured, but eligible households (poverty 
score below 16.17). Columns (2) and (3) show the coefficient and standard error for the average treat-
ment effect on the treated, estimated using propensity score kernel matching. Columns (4) and (5) show 
the coefficient and standard errors for the intention-to-treat effect for households just below the cut-off 
score of 16.17, estimated using a sharp regression discontinuity design
Note on PSM S.E. are derived by bootstrapping the whole process of estimation of propensity scores, 
restricting the sample to common support, matching and ATT estimation. Unit of clustering is the union 
council. Number of bootstraps: 9999. Reported sample size refers to area of common support
Note on RDD Estimated using local linear regression models with a triangular kernel and bandwidth esti-
mated to minimize the mean squared error; SE as proposed in Calonico et al. (2014). Reported sample 
size refers to observations within selected bandwidth
The statistical significance is given as follows: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01, with the null 
hypothesis of the two-sided test being a zero effect size
The suffix win99 indicates that we winsorized the variable at the 99th percentile level
Table D.15 in the Online Appendix shows results for non-logarithmic financial outcomes






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: effects on usage of inpatient care in different subsamples (member-level)
 HH with good knowledge on program details 0.069 − 0.018 0.015  − 0.001 0.008
  N (uninsured/insured, left/right of cut-off) 2007/2313 2863/2755
 HH living within 10 km distance to next empaneled 
hos.
0.066 − 0.014 0.022 − 0.020 0.011
  N (uninsured/insured, left/right of cut-off) 1061/1881 1861/1431
 HH living within 40 min travel distance to next 
hospital
0.049 − 0.005 0.012  0.007 0.010
  N (uninsured/insured, left/right of cut-off) 1061/1419 1713/1326
Panel B: effects on financial outcomes conditional on inpatient usage (member-level)
 Log out-of-pocket expenditures (PKR, win99) 8.947 − 0.256 0.310 − 0.266 0.256
  N (uninsured/insured, left/right of cut-off) 107/212 178/136
 Log of cost for diagnosis and treatment (PKR, 
win99)
4.833 −  0.261 0.562 − 0.601 0.567
  N (uninsured/insured, left/right of cut-off) 107/212 207/151
 Log of cost for medicines (PKR, win99) 8.238 −  0.316 0.398  − 0.030 0.344
  N (uninsured/insured, left/right of cut-off) 107/212 204/147
 Sleepless night due to hospital costs (PKR, win99) 0.486 0.083 0.095  0.028 0.066
  N (uninsured/insured, left/right of cut-off) 107/212 235/170
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or private). To test whether information is indeed an important factor, we restrict our 
sample to those households who answered both these questions correctly and repeat 
the estimation. We display results in Table 8 (first line of Panel A).37 The PSM esti-
mate is negative and insignificant, while the RDD estimate is insignificant as well, 
and very close to zero. These results do not suggest that the program led to higher 
utilization among those with better knowledge of insurance details.
Another barrier might be that the program restricts the choice of care providers 
to specific, empaneled hospitals. At the time of our endline survey, these included 
two public and three private hospitals in the district of Malakand, and two public 
and four private hospitals in the district of Mardan. All hospitals are in city centers, 
hence accessibility remains an issue in rural areas. We measure the distance to these 
hospitals using GPS data and find a median of 9.6 km. Note that this is the geo-
graphic distance calculated from GPS coordinates and likely only proxies accessibil-
ity. We also asked respondents about their travel time to the next hospital, including 
non-empaneled ones, and report a median of 40 minutes. To analyze to which extent 
distance to hospitals restricted the program’s impact, we repeat the estimation of 
effects for households which live within a below-median distance to a hospital, i.e., 
within 10 km to an empanelled hospital or within 40 minutes away from any hos-
pital. We display results in Table 8 (second and third line of Panel A). Again, we 
find no evidence of a program impact on overall inpatient service utilization in these 
subsamples.
An increase in the consumption of inpatient care, however, is only plausible if 
two conditions are fulfilled. First, the insurance should achieve financial protection, 
i.e., it should decrease costs of seeking inpatient care. The second condition is that 
costs of treatment should actually influence inpatient service utilization. In the end-
line survey, we asked respondents about the cost of treatment born out-of-pocket, 
which we use to assess the first condition. We estimate the effect of the program 
on total expenditures and on the individual cost positions for diagnosis and treat-
ment, and medication.38 We present results in Table 8, Panel B.39 Note that we have 
only a very limited sample size, as we only consider individuals who reported a 
case of inpatient care, while at the same time here considering a variable with high 
variation. Therefore, coefficients are not significant, even though we estimate nega-
tive and sizable effects (suggesting a cost decrease of around 30%). Additionally, 
we asked whether those with a hospitalization case experienced sleepless nights due 
37 As before in the analysis of heterogeneous effects, we calculate pseudo RDD-effects at baseline for the 
subsamples considered here to check the plausibility of the RDD assumptions. There are no significant 
effects, as illustrated in Table B.5 in Online Appendix. For the PSM estimation, we calculate propensity 
scores based on covariates Zj, which are again selected anew for each subsample from the set of all base-
line covariates following the same procedure as for the complete PSM sample, described above.
38 We asked separate questions for total costs and individual cost positions to test for possible side pay-
ments demanded by the hospital staff. We find no evidence for this. Note that we did not measure oppor-
tunity costs such as forgone wages, except for transportation, meals, and accommodation for accompany-
ing family members, which we find to be a negligible portion of total expenditures.
39 Due to the highly screwed distribution of the quantitative cost variables, we use log values as out-
comes.
The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review 
to the related costs. In this case, the coefficient is positive, though insignificant. An 
explanation for the counterintuitive result on this subjective measure might be an 
attention bias, given that we previously had asked only insured households about 
their insurance status and understanding of insurance principles. In summary, our 
data are inconclusive when it comes to financial protection achieved by the program. 
It is consistent with a possible decrease in hospitalization costs, though.
Even if the program was successful in decreasing the financial burden of inpa-
tient care, it does not necessarily lead to more utilization. In Sect. 3, we showed that 
using inpatient care in general does not increase with financial wealth, suggesting a 
low risk of moral hazard for an insurer. With higher wealth, however, we observe an 
increase in private care, which patients often associated with higher quality. In other 
words, individuals with urgent health problems might visit a hospital irrespective of 
their wealth. This is consistent with evidence that hospitalization (in contrast to out-
patient care visits) is not very sensitive to cost sharing by an insurer (e.g. Finkelstein 
2007). Poorer individuals, however, seem to seek care at cheaper public facilities. 
We compare average costs of public and private hospitalization in our data. Indeed, 
we see that private care is much more expensive than public care at baseline in our 
sample of interest (39,000 vs. 23,000 PKR).40 Interestingly, it descriptively seems 
like this difference shrinks after the program rollout only for the insured, driven by 
a strong decrease in private care costs.41 Given these observations, it may not be too 
surprising that instead of an overall increase in hospitalization, we measure a shift 
towards private facilities as a result of the program. For a dual health system with 
public and private providers operating in the same market, this is a highly relevant 
result, as the insurance program might also shape the composition of the market in 
the long term.
7  Conclusion
Providing free health insurance to a large number of poor households is an intui-
tive approach to increase health care consumption. The rationale is that high OOP 
expenditures not only pose a financial risk, but also restrict poor households’ access 
to inpatient care. We analyze the effect of the SHPI, which provided free hospitaliza-
tion insurance to the poorest 21% of the population in the Pakistani province of KP, 
on health care seeking behavior. To this end, we apply a regression discontinuity 
approach, comparing households just above and just below the exogenous poverty 
40 The diseases treated in public and private facilities at baseline are largely the same in our data, but 
sample size per disease is too low to comment on statistical significance. A notable exception is that 
whereas only 5.22% of patients were treated for appendicitis in public facilities, the rate is 19.02% among 
patients in private facilities.
41 After the insurance rollout average private care costs are 20,000 PKR and public care costs 13,000 
PKR for the insured, while the difference is much larger for the non-insured (30,000 vs. 13,000 PKR). So 
in particular the relative decrease in costs for private care seems to be larger for the insured at endline. 
The difference in cost for private care between insured and non-insured was in fact the reverse at baseline 
(41,000 PKR for the insured vs 35,000 PKR for the non-insured).
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cut-off score, and a propensity score matching approach, comparing insured and 
uninsured but eligible households. While the former has a higher internal validity, 
it provides estimates of intention-to-treat effects for households around the cut-off 
poverty score only. In contrast, propensity score matching relies on more restricting 
assumptions, but provides average treatment effects on the treated. In this sense the 
two identification strategies complement each other.
In our study, we find that insured households do not increase the quantity of 
inpatient care consumed and have the same propensity to neglect their health care 
as uninsured households. Large-scale multi-stakeholder programs like the SHPI 
naturally face many challenges in implementation, including limited awareness 
and insufficient empanelment of hospitals. Yet, we find no support in our data 
that these factors seriously impaired the program’s impact. Also, we measure 
impact only one year after program introduction. Whereas we concur that the pro-
gram might develop larger impact over a longer period of time, administrative 
data confirms that the program was largely operational within the considered time 
period, in particular in private hospitals. To check whether heterogeneity masks 
effects for some subgroups, we repeat estimations separately for several high-risk 
groups, but also fail to detect significant increases in inpatient care.
Importantly, we do however observe a sizable increase in the propensity 
of visiting a private instead of a public hospital. This result is in line not only 
with administrative data, but also with a larger decrease of reported care costs 
for insured individuals in private compared to public hospitals. Since patients in 
Pakistan often consider private hospitals to provide higher quality of care, this 
is an important and policy-relevant effect of the program, which might thus con-
tribute to a more equitable access to high-quality care. Whether strengthening the 
private sector to overcome possible supply side constraints in the public sector 
leads to desirable outcomes in the long run is an open question, though. Given 
that there are a number of countries with mixed health systems moving towards 
universal insurance coverage, including India and Indonesia, further research on 
the long-term effects on public vs private market sectors seems promising.
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